Crisis Group interviews, civil society representatives, Manbij, March On the increase, see fn 20 above. Hide Footnote U. Convinced that the U. In mid-January , Turkey then moved on Afrin itself, capturing the city on 18 March. Crisis Group interviews, Istanbul, November In early December , Turkey once more dispatched troops to its border with Syria and announced that it would conduct a cross-border operation in northern Syria, targeting YPG forces east of the Euphrates.
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It was this announcement that precipitated the telephone conversation between the U. The current trajectory points toward a repeat of what happened in late as its frustration rises with negotiations it perceives as both endless and fruitless, Turkey may once again escalate.
In July , Turkey started bolstering its military deployment on the Turkish-Syrian border, sending heavy weapons to an area near the Syrian town of Tal Abyad. Hide Footnote The U. Hide Footnote The heavy weapons movements could be a bluff: Ankara might well be loath to target an area that still hosts U.
It is at best a way to buy time — and, should the U.
Still, they acknowledge that negotiations might not go far enough to address core Turkish concerns. Crisis Group interviews, U. The visit came after Turkey increased its military fortifications along the Syria-Turkey border, increasing the fear of a Turkish cross-border attack. In addition, U.
Pompeo and Jeffrey visited Ankara again in April to continue the talks. Yet reaching agreement on a safe zone acceptable to both Turkey and the YPG has proved difficult. Their central demands appear irreconcilable: each insists that such a zone should be under its de facto control. Ankara is demanding that Turkish forces wield ultimate authority, potentially in cooperation with local proxies, much as Turkey has done in Euphrates Shield areas and Afrin.
These include removing all YPG heavy weapons from the zone, boosting local groups to replace the YPG there and monitoring the situation with a mix of U. In January, the U.
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The YPG categorically rejected the idea. At the time of publication, discussions appeared to be focused on boosting the local groups in the SDF while pulling back the YPG from the border areas. Crisis Group interview, U. France objected to the initial U. Crisis Group phone interview, French official, March Jeffrey later declared that that European states would not be part of the safe zone.
Germany is reportedly in talks with the U. Thus far, Turkey has shown no readiness to compromise on its demand for exclusive control throughout a km zone which would stretch to predominantly Kurdish areas , while the YPG has offered no concession that might placate Ankara in the course of discussions about U. The YPG proposal is just as unappetising for Turkey. Without a compromise, Washington may end up imposing a fait accompli on Turkey by maintaining its military protection of the YPG to avoid war.
Even without an explicit commitment, a residual U.
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That said, it would not necessarily discourage or prevent Turkey from destabilising the area or launching a war of attrition against the YPG. They might prompt the YPG to pull its troops out of the Euphrates valley to protect northern Kurdish cities. Such a move would leave areas retaken from ISIS unprotected from the group as it tries to make a comeback. In short, the current U. Even if the U. Besides, the idea that residual U.
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Russia is seeking to balance its desire for a low-cost Syrian regime takeover of areas remaining out of its control against its wish to deepen valuable relations with Turkey. YPG leaders sought Russian mediation for talks with Damascus, hoping to safeguard their autonomous region if and when U.
Arabic YPG officials said the leaked version on which the article was based had slight variations from the original one they submitted to Russia in January It also requested the presence of Russian military police to guarantee the agreement. In return, the YPG would formally recognise Bashar al-Assad as the legitimate president of Syria and the integrity of the Syrian state, its borders, flag and the army.
As Moscow saw it, the high ceiling of these demands suggested that the group remained confident about some degree of continued U. Hide Footnote In response, Russia proposed to the YPG a full return of regime forces to the city of Manbij first, followed by their deployment along the Syria-Turkey border. Hide Footnote With a gap that wide, the talks failed to reach concrete results and have since fizzled out.
Moscow likewise has found no middle ground between Ankara and Damascus. A residual U. The presence of U. Russia remains keen on preserving its good relationship with Turkey and on mediating between the YPG and Damascus. Russian officials suggested that as long as U. If and when the U. Crisis Group interviews, Moscow, February Both the YPG and the regime appear to believe that time is on their side. Damascus is patiently waiting for an eventual U.
An informal regime adviser said:. We are in no rush to solve the Kurdish problem. In the meantime, the Kurds are driving a wedge between the two foreign occupiers [Turkey and the U. The YPG, in turn, hopes to benefit from U. Its ultimate aim is that Damascus recognise the autonomous region — or at least accommodate it. Relations between the YPG and Damascus have been defined by limited security and governance cooperation, economic transactions and stumbling political talks. Damascus maintains a limited security presence in north-eastern Syria including in the cities of Qamishli and al-Hasaka and engages in security coordination with the YPG in a Kurdish neighbourhood of regime-held Aleppo.
Tensions periodically arise between regime and YPG security personnel in Qamishli, but the regime retains a symbolic presence in the town centre and controls the airport. It continues to pay the salaries of some civil servants, and the two main government bakeries in al-Hasaka still receive subsidies from the central government, which also operates some public schools. The two sides also maintain commercial contacts through smuggling networks by which the regime procures oil and wheat from the north east.
On political matters, however, there has been little progress. Hide Footnote SDC representatives put forward an agenda to discuss constitutional changes aimed at securing a degree of autonomy sufficient to block the regime from reasserting dominance over local governance. Regime representatives refused to discuss any governance arrangements that went beyond existing legislation on decentralisation Legislative Decree of , focusing instead on SDF disarmament and reintegration into the Syrian Arab Army.
The full text is available here. The decree attracted interest for its rhetorical emphasis on decentralisation and the devolution of some administrative responsibilities to local bodies, albeit under the authority of governors appointed by the central government. A Syrian official acknowledged that Decree is not operative in any region of Syria, citing the war as the main obstacle.
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Crisis Group interview, Damascus, February Its leadership has repeatedly and publicly expressed its desire to find a tolerable arrangement with Damascus. Crisis Group interview, Derbasiya, March SDC official Ilham Ahmed reiterated this position. Crisis Group interview, Raqqa, November He later publicly reiterated his red lines with Damascus.
The YPG says it also refuses partial arrangements that would entail ceding control over non-Kurdish areas to Damascus. Crisis Group conversations, north-eastern Syria, For its part, Damascus has not budged from its desire to regain every inch of the country and reinstate regime institutions including security and military agencies.
It considers anything short of that a step toward partitioning Syria. While the leadership in Damascus has often shown willingness to discuss limited concessions on administrative decentralisation based on Decree , it has not compromised on wanting to assert full central authority over security services. A regime adviser said:. We have attempted to negotiate with the Kurds, but they have committed a strategic mistake by using their alliance with the U.
The longer this continues, the more difficult it will be for them to renegotiate with the Syrian government. It also will be important in order to avoid a clash between the two parties when the U. Amid stalemate on the three negotiation tracks, worrying dynamics are emerging on the ground: Shortly after losing its last pockets of territory to the SDF at the end of February, ISIS shifted its strategy to an increasingly robust insurgency, which by now threatens to undermine the security situation in a significant part of north-eastern Syria. Crisis Group interview, eastern Syria, March The Pentagon reported in March that ISIS continues to have well-equipped clandestine cells in the north east and might be capable of conducting large-scale attacks.
In addition to hit-and-run attacks, ISIS carried out two high-profile operations: on 16 January, a suicide bomber detonated explosives at a restaurant in Manbij, killing nineteen people, including four Americans; and around midnight on 25 March, gunmen opened fire in Manbij, killing seven SDF fighters manning a checkpoint at the city entrance. ISIS claimed both attacks. Video, YouTube, 29 April The Pentagon report on Operation Inherent Resolve assessed that ISIS is moving into IDP camps and major cities in Syria, and will likely continue to undertake high-profile attacks, particularly in Syrian cities, where they maintain well-supplied clandestine networks.
Crisis Group interviews, tribal leaders, eastern Syria, November March Crisis Group interviews, eastern Syria, March It also holds thousands of family members in ill-supplied makeshift camps. Only Macedonia, Kosovo, Kazakhstan and Morocco have thus far confirmed repatriation of fighters. Some countries, such as France and the Netherlands, have confirmed repatriating orphans only. Earlier that month, the U. Denmark, Finland and Sweden have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, legislation that would permit denaturalisation of ISIS fighters who have dual citizenship.
These governments are increasingly concerned about how they would prosecute these fighters and the domestic backlash repatriation might trigger. Cited in U. These camps now comprise a mix of displaced civilians along with ISIS-affiliated women and children both local and foreign , guarded by under-equipped SDF forces.
Women and children were directed to the al-Houl camp in al-Hasaka province, where foreigners are kept in a separate annex. According to the SDC, the scope of displacement from Hajin was much higher than expected, stretching the capacity of a camp that was designed to accommodate around 10, people. It involved hundreds of ISIS members. Crisis Group interviews, Raqqa, November Crisis Group interview, Asayish head, Qamishli, November These people joined ISIS primarily because of intimidation or to earn a living.
Even if it had wished to detain them all, the YPG would have lacked the capacity to incarcerate such large numbers; it also has been keen to avoid tensions with Arab tribes who regularly ask for the release of their tribal and family members. In Raqqa and Manbij, where Kurds had long lived and the SDF had a good understanding of local dynamics, they identified tribal interlocutors whom they could trust to provide intelligence in return for pardons of low-ranking ISIS fighters and supporters from the tribe.
Despite the fragility of the deals they struck with tribes and the clear lack of proper policies for reintegrating ISIS members in the long term, they quickly secured lands they had captured from ISIS while avoiding feuds with local Arabs over detaining large numbers of local men, especially tribal members. He claimed that not a single released ISIS detainee in the north east had taken part in an attack against the SDF after being pardoned.
Because the YPG lacks sufficient local knowledge in the area, it struggles to find interlocutors who can help them locate ISIS affiliates. Local notables and tribal elders have found it difficult to act effectively as brokers with many of these people, who are strangers to the area. He asserted that most were killed unintentionally during night raids. Crisis Group interview, Syria, May In addition to those who were released or never apprehended, many former militants escaped detention.
Local security structures in eastern Syria are decentralised and dominated by tribes within the SDF that run detention centres and often feud. Run by five judges, it has two branches in north-eastern Syria, in Qamishli and Kobane. One of these judges said the court had handled cases in and 1, in ; it has 7, pending.
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While one current judge is a career jurist, the others are officials who have not completed full judicial training. Crisis Group interview, judge, Qamishli, May Crisis Group interviews, eastern Deir al-Zour, March Crisis Group telephone interview, civil society activist, Deir al-Zour, May Hide Footnote It also often leads the SDF to respond to growing local protests with heavy-handed tactics that cause civilian casualties and fuel grievances. A Western official disputed the tribal perception that the YPG has indiscriminately killed civilians.
Crisis Group telephone interview, May Hide Footnote Some prominent tribal figures in eastern Syria are vexed by what they describe as lax SDF security measures, which they blame for enabling ISIS to step up its hit-and-run attacks on local Arabs. Tensions with the SDF coupled with uncertainty regarding continued U.
In addition to procuring light and medium-range arms, some sought a rapprochement with Damascus. In , ISIS allegedly killed up to a thousand men of the Sheaitat tribe; in response, a significant section of the Sheaitat, which originally supported the Free Syrian Army anti-Assad rebels , changed sides and aligned with the regime.
With questions looming about its future and potential vulnerability to Turkish and regime attacks, the Kurdish-dominated force risks being distracted from the task of dismantling remaining ISIS networks. Crisis Group interview, Qamishli, November That November, the U. Local groups expressed concern about both the lack of security in areas where stabilisation projects were under way and uncertainty over whether funding would continue.
The projects included clearing unexploded ordnance, renovating schools and buying supplies for local clinics. Crisis Group interviews, civil society activists, Raqqa, March Hide Footnote This cooperation was part of a longer-term strategy to prevent these areas from becoming an insurgent breeding ground once more. Officials responsible for stabilisation assistance have likewise gone back, after a period of exclusively administering projects remotely through local partners.
Crisis Group phone interview, U. State Department is considering sending back more of its diplomats to north-eastern Syria under strict security conditions. As the U. Crisis Group interview, Ankara, February As a result, the SDC is struggling even harder than before to address the overwhelming needs in areas its controls. Crisis Group interviews, residents of these areas, August-November , March Within the Trump administration, some have tried to push back against the cuts.
Making their success stick, however, requires stabilising areas taken from ISIS and preventing further military escalation there. For now, the initiative lies with the U. The immediate priority should be for the U.
argo-karaganda.kz/scripts/pezesevel/3425.php Military escalation would propel new waves of refugees toward the border and divert YPG forces from fighting ISIS remnants in the Euphrates valley, potentially enabling them to regain their potency and expand to other areas. Past U. With major ground operations now complete and President Trump clearly keen on eventually withdrawing U. To date, the U. But even should these efforts succeed — and there is no sign that they will — the underlying source of tension will remain and with it, the potential for a Turkish military response to the perceived YPG threat.
Accordingly, and regardless of the future of talks over a buffer zone or other stopgap measures, the U. Prospects for a return to the negotiating table seem remote. But the parties might be able to agree on de-escalation that paves the way for an eventual return to talks. As noted, the YPG likewise should see recent developments as reasons to reach an understanding with Ankara. Find out what's happening in the world as it unfolds. More Videos Israel and Hezbollah exchange border fire. Ukraine President isn't the only leader flattering Trump China prepares for National Day celebrations.
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